- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
An abuse of context in semantics: The case of incomplete definite descriptions
Abstract
Critics and champions alike have fussed and fretted for well over fifty years about whether Russell’s treatment is compatible with certain alleged acceptable uses of incomplete definite descriptions,[2] where a description (the F( is incomplete just in case more than one object satisfies its nominal F, as in (1).Author's Profile
My notes
Similar books and articles
An Abuse of Context in Semantics: The Care of Incomplete Definite Descriptions.Ernie Lepore - 2004 - In Marga Reimer & Anne Bezuidenhout (eds.), Descriptions and beyond. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 42--68.
Reference and incomplete descriptions.Antonio Capuano - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1669-1687.
Incomplete Descriptions and the Underdetermination Problem.Andrei Moldovan - 2015 - Research in Language 13 (4):352–367.
Incomplete descriptions and indistinguishable participants.Paul Elbourne - 2016 - Natural Language Semantics 24 (1):1-43.
Essentially Incomplete Descriptions.Carlo Penco - 2010 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6 (2):47 - 66.
Why incomplete definite descriptions do not defeat Russell's theory of descriptions.Scott Soames - 2005 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):7-30.
Incomplete Symbols — Definite Descriptions Revisited.Norbert Gratzl - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (5):489-506.
Essay fourteen. Why incomplete definite descriptions do not defeat russell’s theory of descriptions.Scott Soames - 2008 - In Philosophical Essays, Volume 1: Natural Language: What It Means and How We Use It. Princeton University Press. pp. 377-400.
Analytics
Added to PP
2009-01-28
Downloads
79 (#216,388)
6 months
1 (#1,516,021)
2009-01-28
Downloads
79 (#216,388)
6 months
1 (#1,516,021)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
The disunity of truth.Josh Dever - 2009 - In Robert Stainton & Christopher Viger (eds.), Compositionality, Context and Semantic Values: Essays in Honour of Ernie Lepore. pp. 174-191.
Descriptions: An Annotated Bibliography.Berit Brogaard - 2010 - Oxford Annotated Bibliographies Online.
Introduction: Referential descriptions: for and against.Eleonora Orlando - 2009 - Análisis Filosófico 29 (2):141-142.
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-68866f4b87-kftwx uwo