Abstract

I present a new interpretation of Plato's discussion of false belief in the Theaetetus. I suggest that Plato is reducing to absurdity a certain view of knowledge. The view being criticized must appeal to the simplicity of the objects of knowledge. I suggest that such a picture of knowledge is present in earlier dialogues. I depart from previous commentators in my view of the nature and importance of the epistemological view in question. Not only is Plato engaging in a bit of self-criticism, but his criticism has broader application. I suggest that certain features of Fregean accounts of thought seem to be open to Plato's line of argument. Recent commentators have assumed the correctness of such accounts, and gone on to criticize Plato from within their perspective. On my view they are guilty of serious misunderstanding of Plato. Plato's rejection of simples in epistemology has application to Fregean models of thought. I also suggest how this discussion paves the way for Plato's conception of dialectic in later dialogues