Plato: Theaetetus

Plato argues, at Theaetetus 170e-171c, that Protagoras’ relativism is self-refuting. This argument, known as the ‘exquisite argument’, and its merits have been the subject of much controversy over the past few decades. Burnyeat (1976b) has argued in defense of Plato’s argument, but his reconstruction of the argument has been criticized as question-begging. After offering an interpretation of Protagoras’ relativism, I argue that the exquisite argument is successful, for reasons that Burnyeat hints at but fails to develop sufficiently. I consider Protagorean (...) relativism under both of the two possible readings with respect to its scope: global relativism, according to which all truths are only relatively true, and qualified relativism, according to which the relativistic thesis itself is excepted. Taking into consideration some contemporary work on relativism and self-refutation, I show that Plato’s argument succeeds on both of these readings. Given that Protagoras could avoid self-contradiction simply by denying that an enduring subject exists, I argue that the exquisite argument is best understood as confronting Protagoras with a dilemma between self-contradiction and self-defeat of various sorts, all of which lead to the same result, that Protagoras violates the requirements of rational discourse in such a way that he becomes an absurd figure who has nothing to say to us. (shrink)

This paper is a test case for the claim, made famous by Myles Burnyeat, that the ancient Greeks did not recognize subjective truth or knowledge. After a brief discussion of the issue in Sextus Empiricus, I then turn to Plato's discussion of Protagorean views in the Theaetetus. In at least two passages, it seems that Plato attributes to Protagoras the view that our subjective experiences constitute truth and knowledge, without reference to any outside world of objects. I argue that these (...) passages have been misunderstood and that on the correct reading, they do not say anything about subjective knowledge. I then try out what I take to be the correct reading of the passages. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the importance of causes in Greek epistemology. (shrink)

La tercera propuesta para definir qué es la epistēmē, que se encuentraal final del Teeteto platónico, fue clásicamente insumida en el elenco de lospioneros de la tesis según la cual el conocimiento debe entenderse como creenciaverdadera justificada. Sin embargo, la situación filosófica de este diálogo esmás compleja. Me propongo examinar aquí la manera en que Platón presenta através de la doctrina del sueño –una teoría que exhibe manifiestas similitudescon el atomismo lógico– una discusión acerca de distintas alternativas relativasa la justificación, (...) como estrategia interpretativa para ponderar de qué manerapueden resultar las ideas piezas indispensables de la epistēmē. Creo que ello nosconduce tanto a reexaminar seriamente la teoría del conocimiento y la metafísicatradicionalmente adscrita a Platón, a partir de conceptos como los de parte ytodo, como también a valorar mejor la posición platónica acerca de cuestionesepistemológicas y semánticas.Theaetetus’ third definition of epistēmē was traditionallylabeled as a precursor of the so-called Justified True Belief Knowledge-Model.Nevertheless, Plato’s point in the last section of this dialogue is more elaboratedthan this classification deems it. I will examine here why and how Plato developssuch a strange doctrine as the Dream-theory in order to offer an interpretation ofthe problem of justification as discussed in the Theaetetus. Thanks to this strategy,I will show that Plato’s Theaetetus aims to prove that the forms are necessarytools not only to justify true beliefs but also, and consequently, to define whatknowledge is. The upshots of this analysis with regard to the complex characterof the objects of knowledge will lead to a reconsideration of Plato’s theory of knowledge and metaphysics. Additionally, they will result in a better understanding of his contribution on certain epistemological and semantic issues. (shrink)

Siendo el símil de la línea un mero esbozo, deja muchos temas poresclarecer. El autor intenta echar luces sobre algunos de ellos apoyándose enotros pasajes de la República. Así, propone una correspondencia entre la reflexiónsobre la estructura del alma en base al principio de no-contradicción y el segmentode la línea correspondiente a la dianoia, y analiza el curriculum matemático delfilósofo para intentar precisar la naturaleza de las imágenes a las que se refiere la eikasia y la naturaleza de los entes (...) matemáticos como objetos de la dianoia.Since the simileof the Line is just an outline, it leaves aside many subjects to be clarified. Theauthor endeavours to throw light on some of them by resorting to other passagesof the Republic. In fact, he proposes a correspondence between the reflectionabout the structure of the soul on the basis of the non-contradiction principleand the section of the Line that belongs to dianoia, and analyzes further thephilosopher’s mathematical curriculum in an attempt to specify the nature of theimages to which the eikasia is related and the nature of mathematical entitiesas objects of dianoia. (shrink)

Replying to Theaetetus’ suggestion that knowledge is true opinion at Tht. 200e, Socrates remarks that ‘a whole profession’ testifies against this definition. The orator practises the art of persuasion, not to teach people, but make them believe whatever he wants. If a robbery has taken place, for example, he cannot in a short time teach adequately the truth about what happened to people who were not on the scene.

Theaetetus, asked what knowledge is, replies that geometry and the other mathematical disciplines are knowledge, and so are crafts like cobbling. Socrates points out that it does not help him to be told how many kinds of knowledge there are when his problem is to know what knowledge itself is, what it means to call geometry or a craft knowledge in the first place—he insists on the generality of his question in the way he often does when his interlocutor, asked (...) for a definition, cites instead cases of the concept to be defined. (shrink)

OF all the things that Plato was, he was primarily a philosopher and a metaphysician. Should this statement seem merely to emphasize the obvious; then let us explain why so simple a statement should rate special mention. There have always been those who are too willing to look upon the author of the ‘Theory of Ideas’ as an artist, a mystic, a poet but not a metaphysician. In this view, Plato’s Ideas are understandable only through the analysis of the personality (...) of an artist; it is a view which interjects far too much of the subjective into what must be seen as the objective ground for his whole philosophy. The possibility of such conflicting views on Plato can be explained by the fact that nowhere does Plato present in his writings a truly definitive Theory of Ideas and a workable proof for them. Some like Stewart require the assistance of psychology to examine Plato. Fite, on a priori grounds, makes a feeble attempt to take Plato out of the realm of any metaphysics whatsoever. Grote confuses reason and myth until nothing remains of Plato but a kind of mixed-up jumble. Others, of course, are loyal to the commitments of a critic and endeavour to discover the meaning of Plato and to present it fairly and honestly. (shrink)

Plato, as a poet, employs muthos extensively to express his philosophical dialectical development, so the majority of his dialogues are comprised of muthoi. We cannot separate his muthos from his philosophical thought, since the former has great influence in the latter. So the methodology of this paper is first to discuss the dialogue "Theaetetus" to find out why he compares Socrates to the Greek goddess Artemis; then his concept of Maieutikē will be investigated. At the beginning of Plato’s "Theaetetus", Socrates (...) first likens himself to the goddess Artemis, who, though unmarried, has a duty to assist women in labour. Socrates’ role, as Plato portrays, is the same as that of Artemis; and the technē he possesses is Maieutikē, which is to assist his students in giving birth to their mental offspring. This paper will focus on discussion on the Socratic mythological role in Platonic interpretation and dialectics so as to reveal the philosophical meaning of Socratic ignorance. (shrink)

The Theaetetus's midwifery metaphor is well-known; less discussed is the brief passage accusing Socrates of behaving like Antaeus. Are philosophers midwives or monsters? Socrates accepts both characterizations. This passage and Socrates's acceptance of the metaphor creates a tension in the text, birthing a puzzle about how readers ought to understand the figure of the philosopher. Because metaphors play a pivotal role in the dialogue's ethical project, the puzzle presents not simply a textual tension but a question of how and why (...) to be a philosopher. (shrink)

The author shows how Protagoras's notion that justice is teachable because it is behavioral conditioning (punishment) in cities that are gangsterism incarnate.

I look at (I) the problem of false speech which Plato faces, (II) the solution he gives in the Sophist, and (III) how that very solution is undermined by the argument of the Theaetetus. I conclude that we ought to see the account of the Theaetetus as overruling the account of the Sophist. On this alternative, Plato holds that false speech and thought really is impossible.

Plato's "theaetetus" (187-200) raises puzzles about false belief. Frege's explanation of how an identity statement can be informative is often seen as a solution to socrates' puzzles. The strategy of frege's solution is to explain a "mistake" as a "mismatch". But it turns out that socrates' argument, In fact, Is aware of and rejects this strategy.

A close reading of Socrates’ arguments against the proposed definition of knowledge as true opinion together with a logos (“account”). I examine the orienting implications of his apparently destructive dilemma defeating the so-called dream theory and of his apparently decisive arguments rejecting the notions of “account” as verbalization, as working through the parts of the whole of the definiendum, and as identifying what differentiates the definiendum from all else. Whereas the dilemma implies of the object of knowledge that it must (...) be both simple and complex, the last two notions of “account” point to the kinds of discursive analysis that can do justice to its complexity; together the refutations suggest the relation between noesis, that is, eidetic intuition of the object in its simplicity, and discursive analysis of the object in its complexity that knowledge requires. (shrink)

Stoics and Sceptics distinguish belief (doxa) from a representationally and functionally similar but sub-doxastic state: passive yielding to appearance. Belief requires active assent to appearances, that is, affirmation of the appearances as true. I trace the roots of this view to Plato's accounts of doxa in the Republic and Theaetetus. In the Republic, eikasia and pistis (imaging and conviction) are distinguished by their objects, appearances versus ordinary objects; in the Theaetetus, perception and doxa are distinguished by their objects, proper perceptibles (...) versus ‘commons’, including being. But underlying these ontological distinctions is a psychological one: the lower mental states are confined to their lower objects because they are passive; the higher mental states have access to higher objects because they result from questioning appearances and making active affirmations about how things are. This doctrine of doxa anticipates both the Hellenistic one and modern accounts of belief as ‘aiming at truth’; it also shows Plato's views of doxa to have more in their favour philosophically and to cohere better with one another than generally thought. (shrink)