Abstract

The need today, according to Cohen, is not for more criticism of old theories of induction but for new theories to criticize. In his recent book, he presents a new theory of induction in which he attempts to develop Bacon's seminal ideas "in a way that is not vitiated by obsession with the mathematical calculus of probabilities." Consequently, "induction" in the title would seem to refer to Baconian Induction, i.e. induction by variation of circumstances as distinct from induction by enumeration. The author offers his book as an analysis of the logical syntax of "support" for such induction. He prefers the metaphor of "support" to Carnap's metaphor of "confirmation" since the former is spatial and the latter is temporal and "... inductive support is timeless support for timeless propositions...." The first six chapters, the bulk of the book, are philosophical in character, while the last chapter contains a formalization of a system of inductive logic based on C. I. Lewis. In the philosophical sections, the author proposes that induction as used in various fields, e.g. by the scientist or lawyer, does not differ in method or logical syntax but in subject-matter. For this reason, he finds it necessary to present a logical system of induction as a conclusion to the book. Cohen invites criticism of his new theory of induction. The present reviewer feels that the author has misunderstood Aristotelian induction. Aristotelian induction means, primarily, being led from one truth to another and not the enumeration of instances. Rhetorical example has, for Aristotle, the nature of induction. Furthermore, the author himself seems to introduce time as a factor when he assesses inductive support in legal reasoning. This seems inconsistent with "timeless support for timeless propositions." Cohen's new theory is one that is worth a critical examination.--L. A.