Abstract

Popper’s situational logic and its underlying rule–the rationality principle–have not attracted much attention from economists and social scientists. This is an odd situation, since Popper explicitly says that situational logic is a generalization of the method used in neoclassical economics. This indifference among economists may be partially explained by the criticism of many methodologists, namely that Popper’s arguments concerning the epistemological status of the rationality principle are misleading, incoherent and even incompatible with the essence of falsificationism. In what follows we intend to argue that the accusations of incoherence which has been leveled at Popper do not hold up to critical scrutiny, if we consider the epistemological role of the rationality postulate as a regulative maxim of social inquiry. Therefore it is concluded that, as far as it is situated in a metatheoretical context, the rationality principle embraces undeniable importance as a foundation of economic theory. Its absence or non-existence would imply the unavailability of the necessary instruments to submit the theory to tests.