Truth, rationality, and the situation

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 28 (3):400-421 (1998)
Abstract
The Rationality Principle says that people act adequately to their situation, but does not specify how they must act in order to do so. Situational Analysis uses the Rationality Principle, together with a model of the social situation, to explain actions in the past. Unlike Rational Choice Theory, Situational Analysis does not try to predict or influence actions in the future. Popper regarded the Rationality Principle as false, but thought that we should use it nonetheless. This poses a problem for understanding his views about conjecture and refutation. Popper, however, thought that all scientific models are false, and that whether or not we should reject a model depends on the problem that we are trying to solve.
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DOI 10.1177/004839319802800305
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References found in this work BETA
What is Dialectic?Karl R. Popper - 1940 - Mind 49 (196):403-426.
Critical Rationalism. A Restatement and Defence.David Miller - 1995 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 185 (3):368-371.

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Citations of this work BETA
The Rationality Principle Idealized.Boaz Miller - 2012 - Social Epistemology 26 (1):3-30.
Popper’s Ontology of Situated Human Action.Allen Oakley - 2002 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (4):455-486.

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