Explanatory Games

Journal of Philosophy 110 (11):606-632 (2013)
Authors
C. Mantzavinos
University of Athens
Abstract
A philosophical theory of explanation should provide solutions to a series of problems, both descriptive and normative. The aim of this essay is to establish the claim that this can be best done if one theorizes in terms of explanatory games rather than focusing on the explication of the concept of explanation. The position that is adopted is that of an explanatory pluralism and it is elaborated in terms of the rules that incorporate the normative standards that guide the processes of discovery and justification of explanations as well as the modes of their communication, dissemination, and adoption. They constitute the rules of the explanatory game that the participants are playing. The philosophical project consists in describing and normatively appraising the rules that constitute these games.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy
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ISBN(s) 0022-362X
DOI 10.5840/jphil2013110117
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Epistemic Democracy: Beyond Knowledge Exploitation.Julian Müller - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (5):1267-1288.
Text Interpretation as a Scientific Activity.C. Mantzavinos - 2014 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 45 (1):45-58.

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