Borges, the Apologist for Idealism

The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 25:23-30 (1998)
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Abstract

In Nueva refutación del tiempo, Borges explicitly interprets both Berkeley and Hume as genuine exponents and "apologists" of idealism. We may not owe Berkeley the discovery of a doctrine which according to Borges is practically as "ancient" and "popular" as metaphysics itself. However, his arguments connote a unique philosophical achievement. Borges himself adheres to these arguments and goes beyond them. He makes Berkeley's doctrine flow into Hume's which in turn flows into the uniform ocean of pantheistic idealism as envisioned by Schopenhauer and by Oriental philosophy. A close reading of the story "Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius" shows how the epistemology inherent in the language descriptions of this planet leads its metaphysicians to move from the underlying Berkeleian-Humean principles to the acceptance of pantheistic idealism. This story is not only a subtle, imaginative fantasy; it is also a work of intellectual elegance reading deep into the problem of knowledge of the external world. Berkeley and Hume devoted their whole attention to this issue and developed views that could adequately address the problem. Borges avoids arguing whether their doctrine falls under the denomination of "immaterialism," "phenomenalism" or "idealism." He seems either to deliberately ignore this scholarly dispute or to go beyond it in an effort to let the texts speak for themselves. Thus, Berkeley's Principles, and Hume's Treatise and first Enquiry show a common fact: the world is mind-dependent.

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