Abstract
One of John Dewey’s goals as a philosopher was to rescue his discipline from the epistemological deadlocks centered about the concept of essence, or as he might have put it, to disengage philosophy from its excessive concern with the fixed and the sure. In order to do this he stressed the contextual aspect of philosophical construction, and, so some claim, undercut belief in the existence of an a priori realm of essence determining activity. The purpose of this paper is to point out that this is not the case. My procedure will be: to present Dewey’s understanding of the causes for the epistemological deadlocks in philosophy’s past; to present the implications of this understanding and its effect upon philosophical method; to present the metaphysical implications of the first two points. I hope to make it clear that Dewey recognized the existence of something prior to an experienced context which limited its possibilities and that there is validity to an inquiry into this something prior to an experienced context. To such he gave the name of metaphysics.