Putnam's Brains

Analysis 44 (2):59--61 (1984)
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10.1093/analys/44.2.59

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Jane L. McIntyre
Cleveland State University

Citations of this work

In Defense of Putnam’s Brains.Thomas Tymoczko - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 57 (3):281--97.
Putnam’s Brain-Teaser.David Davies - 1995 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):203--27.
Putnam’s Brain-Teaser.David Davies - 1995 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):203-227.
Semantic self-knowledge and the vat argument.Joshua Rowan Thorpe - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2289-2306.
Once More Unto The Breach: Strawson's Anti-sceptical View.Marco Antonio Franciotti - 2009 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 13 (2):137-152.

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