A Pluralist Theory of Perception

Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press (2024)
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Abstract

Most contemporary theories of perception, including leading forms of representationalism and naive realism, are monistic: they assume that to consciously perceive is to deploy only one kind of sensory awareness. Here I instead argue for rich pluralism, which says that to consciously perceive is to deploy two very different kinds of sensory awareness in concert: representational awareness of particulars, and non-representational, partly essence-revealing awareness of sensory qualities.

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Neil Mehta
Yale-NUS College

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