Naïve Realism with Many Fundamental Kinds

Acta Analytica 37 (2):197-218 (2022)
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Abstract

Naïve realism is a theory of perception with great explanatory ambitions. It has been influentially argued that, in order to realize these explanatory ambitions, the naïve realist should say that any perception belongs to just one fundamental kind. I think, however, that adopting this commitment does not particularly help the naïve realist to realize her explanatory ambitions, and so is not warranted. This result is significant because once this commitment about fundamental kinds is relinquished, we see that it is possible to develop some new and surprising forms of naïve realism—most notably, what I call pluralist naïve realism.

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Neil Mehta
Yale-NUS College

Citations of this work

Bad to the bone: essentially bad perceptual experiences.Ivan V. Ivanov - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 67 (9):3630-3656.

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Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.

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