On the Unrestraint in Beliefs

Dialogue and Universalism 24 (3):36-39 (2014)
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Abstract

This article studies the unrestraint in beliefs associated with the overemphasizing of our beliefs. The author argues that the intolerance for other points of view appears (among other factors) because of a naively-objectivist understanding of philosophy, one which is based on two assumptions: first, philosophy is considered only as a theory and not an individual practice, not an experience, and second, the truth is considered as identical to a certain ideal-objective content that can be in one’s possession.There are true ideas and proper words. If we learn these ideas, we will definitely seize the truth. The author opposes this understanding the notion of philosophy which is based on the experience of the encounter and upon reflexive comprehension of this experience. It is possible to minimize unrestraint in beliefs if we assume that all the points of view including our own are considered as belonging to the incomprehensible Absolute.

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