A Theory of Power: Political, Not Metaphysical.

Dissertation, Princeton University (1989)
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Abstract

From Hobbes to Weber, discussions of power increasingly made a modern concept of "will" their pivotal category. Although sometimes tinged with other concerns, this tendency continues today. Focusing through the lens of the "will" displays an image of power that reasserts untenable conceptions of the person and obscures the fact that power is a relation and not a property, a faculty, or a thing-in-itself. The dissertation tackles this fundamental problem. ;To begin, "dependence" is given the centering position. "Dependence," unlike "will," is a necessarily relational concept. A distinction is introduced between dependence-from-things and dependence-from-persons. The interrelation between these is considered in terms of non-formal anthropological conceptions of reciprocity. This complex reciprocity is contrasted to reciprocity understood as "equality." ;Paradoxically, the theoretical move to contextually determined reciprocity forces reconsideration of the "will," for the background normative institutional patterns of reciprocity in liberal societies are delineated in terms of the "will." This is a virtuous, not a vicious, circle. Once the "will" has been forced from its central position in the theory of power, a critical perspective is gained by viewing "will" through "dependence." ;An analysis of the ways people rationalize or appropriate to their own advantage the unintended consequences of action illuminates the link between "will" and "dependence." The emergence of dependence itself provides a general example of an "unintended consequence of action." People seeking to gain advantage assert their independence from the unintended, even while appropriating the "unintended consequences of action." Cultural patterns for denying dependence play an important part in asserting advantage. ;Disruptions of practical relations of reciprocity cannot be determined a priori; rather, they follow from speech and action. These disruptions lead to contention. Two notoriously vague notions, public and private, have long been terms for playing out such contentions. Theorists often assume that public/private indicates two distinct "spheres" . By contrast, the present theory provides an approach to the analysis of the transformation of private into public. This is a necessary condition for the emergence and control of power

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