Abstract

In his own words, Rancière’s method resembles Foucault’s. But, even if only in passing, Rancière has also touched on some of the divergences existing between his own work and Foucault’s. These aspects can be found in La Mésentente, along with two interviews—the first of which was conducted by Eric Alliez and the second with one of his translators, Gabriel Rockhill. Among the major points sketched in these texts—and on which this paper will be based—is Rancière’s brief but frank criticism of the notion of biopolitics. The aim of the present paper is not to produce a systematic commentary on the similarities and differences that can be said to exist between these two thinkers, but rather to discuss Rancière’s criticism on the basis of an empirical case, namely contemporary claims made around autism as a form of subjectivity. The scope of the paper is thus not exegetical. Rather, what it shall seek to discuss is the operativity of Rancière’s critical remarks in fields studying subjectivities such as autism. Yet, as the criticism leveled at Foucault by Rancière is a corollary of a discrepancy present between their respective methods, and, moreover, as such a difference will be addressed through the lens of a central category from the latter’s theoretical repertoire—namely, the “distribution of the sensible”—it will be necessary to start with a brief account of its most fundamental points.