Modelling Intuitions and Thought Experiments

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):181-214 (2007)
Abstract
The first, critical part of the paper summarizes J. R. Brown’s Platonic view of thought experiments (TEs) and raises several questions. One of them concerns the initial, particular judgments in a TE. Since they seem to precede the general insight, Brown’s Platonic intuition, and not to derive from it, the question arises as to the nature of the initial particular judgment. The other question concerns the explanatory status of Brown’s epistemic Platonism. The second, constructive descriptive-explanatory part argues for an alternative, i.e. the view of TE as reasoning in, or with help of, mental models which can accommodate all the relevant data within a non-aprioristic framework (or, at worst, within a minimally “aprioristic”, nativist one). The last part turns to issues of justification and argues that the mental model proposal can account for justification of intuitional judgments and can also support the view of properly functioning intuition as an epistemic virtue, all within a more naturalist framework than the one endorsed by Brown
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 1333-1108
DOI croatjphil20077218
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,248
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Brown and Berkeley.Ksenija Puškarić - 2007 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):177-180.
Intuitions in Science: Thought Experiments as Argument Pumps.Darrell P. Rowbottom - 2014 - In Anthony R. Booth & Darrell P. Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions. Oxford University Press. pp. 119-134.
Do Thought Experiments Have a Life of Their Own? Comments on James Brown, Nancy Nersessian and David Gooding.Ian Hacking - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:302 - 308.
Intuitions.Nenad Miscevic - 2006 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):523-548.
The A Priori Thesis.Sören Häggqvist - 2007 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):47-61.
Remodeling the Past.Tim De Mey - 2005 - Foundations of Science 10 (1):47-66.
Problems with the Appeal to Intuition in Epistemology.Adam Feltz - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (2):131 – 141.
Intuitions and Relativity.Kirk Ludwig - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):427-445.
Added to PP index
2011-12-01

Total downloads
45 ( #118,861 of 2,192,214 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #42,377 of 2,192,214 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature