Abstract

This dissertation attempts to establish that Nietzsche's philosophical development from 1864 to 1870 is directed towards finding a satisfactory way to redeem the sufferings of life immanently, that is, without appeal to a state of perfect being beyond the grave. I argue that this stage of his thinking culminates in the belief that the project of self-expressive self-determination was a satisfactory source of immanent redemption, and I therefore label this enterprise the project of redemptive self-determination. ;In the first of the dissertation's three parts I show how Nietzsche's confrontation with Schopenhauer's pessimism led him to believe that an acceptable practical philosophy--that is, a set of maxims prescribing or prohibiting the direction of one's energies towards the achievement of certain ends--had to be compatible with atheism and metaphysical pessimism . In part two I explain what redemptive self-determination is and argue for its presence in Nietzsche's thinking during the period covered. And in part three I show how his commitment to redemptive self-determination shaped his views of the promise and purpose of classical philology and the nature and death of Greek tragedy