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Is Personal Identity Something That Does Not Matter? An Inquiry into Derek Parfit and Alfred N. Whitehead
Process Studies 42 (1):87-109 (2013)
Abstract
The purpose of the present article is to disentangle both Parfit’s and Whitehead’s views on personal identity. Issues regarding what it means to be a singular individual, how a person can remain the same over time, and what makes an individual an original being with specific characteristics will be examinedAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
Learning from Leibniz: Whitehead (and Russell) on Mind, Matter and Monads.Pierfrancesco Basile - 2015 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (6):1128-1149.
On Humility as a Regulative Virtue in Becoming a Person.Ludwig Jaskolla - 2015 - Process Studies 44 (2):224-245.
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