Although panpsychism has had a very long history, one that goes back to the very origin of western philosophy, its force has only recently been appreciated by analytic philosophers of mind. And even if many still reject the theory as utterly absurd, others have argued that it is the only genuine form of physicalism. This paper examines the case for panpsychism and argues that there are at least good prima facie reasons for taking it seriously. In a second step, the (...) paper discusses the main difficulty the theory has to face, the 'composition problem'. This is the problem of explaining how the primitive experiences that are supposed to exist at the ultimate level of reality could give rise to the unified experience of a human being. What assumptions as to the nature of experience generate the composition problem? Is mental composition impossible in principle or do we simply lack at present any understanding of phenomenal parts and wholes? (shrink)
Russell’s critique of substance monism is an ideal starting point from which to understand some main concepts in Spinoza’s difficult metaphysics. This paper provides an in-depth examination of Spinoza’s proof that only one substance exists. On this basis, it rejects Russell’s interpretation of Spinoza’s theory of reality as founded upon the logical doctrine that all propositions consist of a predicate and a subject. An alternative interpretation is offered: Spinoza’s substance is not a bearer of properties, as Russell implied, but an (...) eternally active, self-actualizing creative power. Eventually, Spinoza the Monist and Russell the Pluralist are at one in holding that process and activity rather than enduring things are the most fundamental realities. (shrink)
This paper provides an interpretation and evaluation of Spinoza's highly original version of the ontological proof in terms of the concept of substance instead of the concept of perfection in the first book of his Ethics. Taking the lead from Kant's critique of ontological arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason, the paper explores the underlying ontological and epistemological presuppositions of Spinoza's proof. The main topics of consideration are the nature of Spinoza's definitions, the way he conceives of the relation (...) between a substance and its essence, and his conception of existence. Once clarity is shed upon these fundamental issues, it becomes possible to address the proof in its own terms. It is then easy to see that Kant's objections miss their target and that the same is true of those advanced by another of the ontological argument's most famous critics, Bertrand Russell. Finally, several interpretations of Spinoza's proof are proposed and critically evaluated; on all of them, the argument turns out to be either invalid or question-begging. (shrink)
Although panpsychism has had a very long history, one that goes back to the very origin of western philosophy, its force has only recently been appreciated by analytic philosophers of mind. And even if many still reject the theory as utterly absurd, others have argued that it is the only genuine form of physicalism. This paper examines the case for panpsychism and argues that there are at least good prima facie reasons for taking it seriously. In a second step, the (...) paper discusses the main difficulty the theory has to face, the ‘composition problem’. This is the problem of explaining how the primitive experiences that are supposed to exist at the ultimate level of reality could give rise to the unified experience of a human being. What assumptions as to the nature of experience generate the composition problem? Is mental composition impossible in principle or do we simply lack at present any understanding of phenomenal parts and wholes? (shrink)
The contributions gathered in this volume, written by philosophers of international reputation or by acknowledged scholars in their specialized fields of ...
Whitehead's system may be interpreted as a majestic attempt at recasting Leibniz's theory of monads in terms of sounder ontological categories. After a brief introductory section on the sources of Whitehead's knowledge of Leibniz's philosophy, the paper explains why Whitehead turned to Leibniz for metaphysical inspiration. Attention then shifts to Whitehead's understanding of the problems involved with Leibniz's theory of monads and his alternative explanation of monadic causation. Whitehead's endeavour to install windows in Leibniz's monads may not be entirely convincing, (...) but there are philosophical gems scattered here and there in his analyses – true moments of insight that repay close examination. (shrink)
This paper provides a brief critique of Jaegwon Kim’s evaluation of the achievements of materialist physicalism and then goes on to examine the case for panpsychism and the main objection that has been raised against it, i.e., the composition problem. The object of this examination is to lay bare the fundamental assumptions underlying both the main argument in support of the theory and the objection against it. Whitehead’s panexperientialism has a fair claim to be regarded as the most elaborate version (...) of the theory ever produced. Once the logical structure of the composition problem has been clarified, however, it becomes possible to see that—contrary to what has been argued by David Ray Griffin in his important book, Unsnarling the World-Knot—even Whitehead’sversion of the doctrine fails to provide a satisfactory solution. The paper is brought to an end with a general reflection on the shortcomings of current critiques of panpsychism. Whitehead’s panexperientialism cannot be accepted as it stands and panpsychism as a general philosophical position is not supported by a conclusive proof; nevertheless, the notion that experience is a pervasive feature of reality has the unquestionable merit of being a wholly adequate response to a real philosophical perplexity. (shrink)
This paper provides a brief critique of Jaegwon Kim’s evaluation of the achievements of materialist physicalism and then goes on to examine the case for panpsychism and the main objection that has been raised against it, i.e., the composition problem. The object of this examination is to lay bare the fundamental assumptions underlying both the main argument in support of the theory and the objection against it. Whitehead’s panexperientialism has a fair claim to be regarded as the most elaborate version (...) of the theory ever produced. Once the logical structure of the composition problem has been clarified, however, it becomes possible to see that—contrary to what has been argued by David Ray Griffin in his important book, Unsnarling the World-Knot—even Whitehead’sversion of the doctrine fails to provide a satisfactory solution. The paper is brought to an end with a general reflection on the shortcomings of current critiques of panpsychism. Whitehead’s panexperientialism cannot be accepted as it stands and panpsychism as a general philosophical position is not supported by a conclusive proof; nevertheless, the notion that experience is a pervasive feature of reality has the unquestionable merit of being a wholly adequate response to a real philosophical perplexity. (shrink)
(2010). Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein (eds): The American Philosophers (Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. XXVIII) British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 726-730.
Whitehead and Dewey called for a deep reform of philosophy. Although they respected one another, Dewey can be read as criticizing Whitehead for hisadherence to a traditional, and unfortunately conservative, way of conceiving of the discipline. This article provides an in-depth reconstruction as well as a qualified defense of Dewey’s charge.
Whitehead and Dewey called for a deep reform of philosophy. Although they respected one another, Dewey can be read as criticizing Whitehead for hisadherence to a traditional, and unfortunately conservative, way of conceiving of the discipline. This article provides an in-depth reconstruction as well as a qualified defense of Dewey’s charge.
