Knowledge and objectivity

Rome, Metropolitan City of Rome, Italy: Aracne (2011)
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Abstract

Giovanni Mion defends the idea that knowledge is context relative, but, in contrast to current versions of epistemic contextualism, on his view, knowledge is relative to contexts that are objective. Following Christopher Gauker’s conception of what a context is, Mion argues that knowledge is relative to the speakers’ conversational goals; and since the best way to achieve the goals of a conversation depends upon the way the world really is, it follows that participants in a conversation might be unaware of the content of the context that truly governs their conversation. Finally, Mion uses objective contexts to explain why practical interests have epistemic significance. According to him, if we assume that the primary function of language is not to share thoughts, but to achieve practical goals, and, accordingly, that knowledge attributions play primarily an action-guiding role (as opposed to a mind-revealing role), then we are in a better position to understand why knowledge is not just a matter of theoretical factors, but it is also a matter of how much is at stake.

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