Abstract

Philosophers often treat beliefs as propositional attitudes that entail taking the content as true. However, there exist certain mental states, such as delusions, that challenge this dogmatic norm, leading some researchers to question its validity. This chapter delves into that philosophical inquiry that surrounds the nature of beliefs and establishes a contrastive perspective in cases of delusion, self-deception, sectarian influence, and scientific negationism. We should explore the notion of privileged access to our own mental states acknowledging the importance of self-ascription as being more indirect than commonly believed. We may find that self-ascription is a result of our mindreading ability applied to ourselves and there could be a plausible biological evolution of the cognitive mechanism that underlies. This chapter discusses the evolutionary escalation of mindreading in humans, reviews philosophical accounts of mindreading, and evaluates different theories of belief self-attribution. It concludes with the implications for understanding belief-related phenomena and their cognitive underpinnings.