Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):146-147 (2009)

Ori Friedman
University of Waterloo
Mindreading often requires access to beliefs, so the mindreading system should be able to self-attribute beliefs, even without self-interpretation. This proposal is consistent with Carruthers' claim that mindreading and metacognition depend on the same cognitive system and the same information as one another; and it may be more consistent with this claim than is Carruthers' account of metacognition
Keywords theory of mind  mind reading  belief attribution
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X09000648
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Core Mechanisms in ‘Theory of Mind’.Alan M. Leslie, Ori Friedman & Tim P. German - 2004 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (12):528-533.

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