- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
The ordinal utility under uncertainty and the measure of risk aversion in terms of preferences
Theory and Decision 18 (1):73-85 (1985)
Abstract
This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)My notes
Similar books and articles
Ordinal utility models of decision making under uncertainty.Charles F. Manski - 1988 - Theory and Decision 25 (1):79-104.
Moment characterization of higher-order risk preferences.Sebastian Ebert - 2013 - Theory and Decision 74 (2):267-284.
Economic choice in generalized expected utility theory.John Quiggin - 1995 - Theory and Decision 38 (2):153-171.
The risk aversion measure without the independence axiom.Aldo Montesano - 1988 - Theory and Decision 24 (3):269-288.
Production under Uncertainty and Choice under Uncertainty in the Emergence of Generalized Expected Utility Theory.John Quiggin - 2001 - Theory and Decision 51 (2/4):125-144.
Temporal risk aversion: What determines the attitude of the decision Maker? The case of the buyer decision Maker.Paola Ferretti - unknown
Rationality and risk aversion: On Expected Utility and risk aversion in normative decision theory.Oskar Qvarfort - 2022 - Dissertation, Umeå University
A note on decisions under uncertainty: the impact of the choice of the welfare measure.Andreas Lange - 2001 - Theory and Decision 51 (1):51-71.
Choice under Risk and the Security Factor: An Axiomatic Model.Jean-Yves Jaffray - 1988 - Theory and Decision 24 (2):169.
Uncertainty aversion and aversion to increasing uncertainty.Aldo Montesano & Francesco Giovannoni - 1996 - Theory and Decision 41 (2):133-148.
Analytics
Added to PP
2013-01-04
Downloads
33 (#472,742)
6 months
7 (#591,670)
2013-01-04
Downloads
33 (#472,742)
6 months
7 (#591,670)
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
References found in this work
Expected Utility Hypotheses and the Allais Paradox.Maurice Allais & Ole Hagen (eds.) - 1979 - D. Reidel.
Criticism of the Neo-Bernoullian formulation as a behavioural rule for rational man.Maurice Allais - 1979 - In Maurice Allais & Ole Hagen (eds.), Expected Utility Hypotheses and the Allais Paradox. D. Reidel. pp. 74--106.
The So-Called Allais Paradox and Rational Decisions Under Uncertainty.Maurice Allais - 1979 - In Maurice Allais & Ole Hagen (eds.), Expected Utility Hypotheses and the Allais Paradox. D. Reidel.
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-6686886f5-kkm7k uwo