The Medical Model and the Philosophy of Science

In K. W. M. Fulford, Martin Davies, Richard Gipps, George Graham, John Sadler, Giovanni Stanghellini & Tim Thornton (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy and psychiatry. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2013)
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Abstract

This chapter sketches an account of psychiatric explanation with roots in contemporary philosophy of science and suggests that it is a natural fit with what it will call the strong interpretation of the medical model in psychiatry. The chapter starts by distinguishing between strong and minimal ways to understand the medical model before it moves on to talk about explanation. The basic idea of the chapter is that the logic of the medical model, together with recent developments in the sciences of the brain, suggests that psychiatry should be seen as a kind of cognitive neuroscience. The second part of the chapter discusses some issues in applying mechanistic explanatory models to mental disorders. Recent philosophical work on explanation in the cognitive neurosciences has seen it as mechanistic explanation. A mechanistic explanation shows how components of a system interact to give rise to the phenomenon to be explained.

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Dominic Murphy
University of Sydney

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Depression as a Disorder of Consciousness.Cecily Whiteley - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

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