Erkenntnis:1-17 (forthcoming)

Bence Nanay
University of Antwerp
The concept of mental representation has long been considered to be central concept of philosophy of mind and cognitive science. But not everyone agrees. Neo-behaviorists aim to explain the mind without positing any representations. My aim here is not to assess the merits and demerits of neo-behaviorism, but to take their challenge seriously and ask the question: What justifies the attribution of representations to an agent? Both representationalists and neo-behaviorists tend to take it for granted that the real question about representations is whether we should be realist about the theory of representationalism. This paper is an attempt to shift the emphasis from the debate concerning realism about theories to the one concerning realism about entities. My claim is that regardless of whether we are realist about representational theories of the mind, we have compelling reasons to endorse entity realism about mental representations.
Keywords Entity realism  Representation
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-019-00185-4
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References found in this work BETA

Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.
Representing and Intervening.Ian Hacking - 1987 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 92 (2):279-279.
Science and human behavior.B. F. Skinner - 1954 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 144:268-269.
Representations Gone Mental.Alex Morgan - 2014 - Synthese 191 (2):213-244.

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Analog Mental Representation.Jacob Beck - forthcoming - WIREs Cognitive Science.
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