Exclusion and Sufficient Reason: N. M. L. Nathan

Philosophy 85 (3):391-397 (2010)

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Abstract
I argue for two principles by combining which we can construct a sound cosmological argument. The first is that for any true proposition p's if ‘there is an explanation for p's truth’ is consistent then there is an explanation for p's truth. The second is a modified version of the principle that for any class, if there is an explanation for the non-emptiness of that class, then there is at least one non-member of that class which causes it not to be empty.
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DOI 10.1017/S0031819110000227
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