Abstract

Two proposals regarding what the primary psychological interface is are critically discussed. One proposal posits an actual overlap of consciousness and reality. The parts of the physical world that are directly perceived, or "self-given" — given themselves in person — to perceptual consciousness, are also elements of that consciousness. Each such part is supposed to have a kind of double existence, in the physical world and also in consciousness. Against this view, I argue that perceptual awareness makes portions of the physical world self-given only in their being manifested or appearing in consciousness, whereas the portions themselves remain completely external to consciousness. Other authors claim that the primary psychological interface is an animal’s perceptual activity with respect to the ecological environment. But, this interface does not amount, for them, to the animal’s perceptual awareness in the familiar, ordinary sense of the experiencing of things by means of the senses, or as theoretically conceived of by the act psychologists of the nineteenth century; rather, perceptual awareness is a feature of the animal’s actions upon the ecological environment. Against this view, I argue that an occurrent perceptual awareness is a central, unperceivable product and part of a larger activity of perceiving and an element of the actual interface between reality and consciousness