Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (2):202-216 (2016)

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Abstract
Telic sufficientarianism is the view that it is better, other things equal, if people are lifted above some sufficiency threshold of special moral importance. In a recent contribution, Shlomi Segall has raised the following objection to this position: The telic ideal of sufficiency can neither be grounded on any personal value, nor any impersonal value. Consequently, sufficientarianism is groundless. This article contains a rejoinder to this critique. Its main claim is that the value of autonomy holds strong potential for grounding sufficiency. It argues, firstly, that autonomy carries both personal value for its recipient as well as impersonal value, and that both of these values are suitable for grounding sufficiency. It thus follows that we should reject both and. Secondly, although autonomy is presumably the strongest candidate for grounding sufficiency, the article provides some counterargument to Segall's rejection of the other candidates — the impersonal value of virtue; the personal value for the allocator; and the personal value for others. If the arguments are sound, they show that we need not worry about sufficientarianism being groundless.
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DOI 10.1111/japp.12159
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The Prospects for Sufficientarianism.Liam Shields - 2012 - Utilitas 24 (1):101-117.
What is Wrong with Sufficiency?Lasse Nielsen - 2019 - Res Publica 25 (1):21-38.
Sufficiency and the Threshold Question.Robert Huseby - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 24 (2):207-223.
Sufficientarianism and the Separateness of Persons.Shlomi Segall - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):142-155.
From Rawlsian Autonomy to Sufficient Opportunity in Education.Liam Shields - 2015 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 14 (1):53-66.

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