Abstract

This first-time and excellent English-Arabic production of an eleventh-century work by the moral philosopher Miskawayh consists of “Conclusive Answers to Disparate Questions” put to him by Tawhidi, a literary intellectual. The book should not be viewed simply as a window for the modern English reader on what occupied the minds of thinkers in that milieu and of that period. As Vasalou notes in the introduction, the work does not quite fit into the Arabic genre of the Aristotelian Problemata literature, where one expects to find straightforward arguments between opposed views on specific topics; the work is sui generis in consisting of brief but serious “teacher” responses to a series of disconnected and what often seem to be simplistic but taunting questions raised by an inquirer whom we know to have been as knowledgeable in philosophy as the respondent himself. (In one about how customs of different nations originate, the respondent's curt answer is that he neither knows nor cares to know, this not being a matter that adds to knowledge!) It is this strange feature of the work—rather than the classical answers provided by the philosopher—that has occupied contemporary scholars (like Mohammed Arkoun) who have worked on the subject. What was Tawhidi's intention in putting such questions to Miskawayh?As Vasalou points out, the questions often seem articulated more in the form of wonderment about a common fact (“Why is it so?”) than to stimulate a pedantic answer (“This is what the textbook says”). For example, why is it that we can create images for ourselves of what we consider to be the most hideous but are unable to conceive images of the finest or purest or most beautiful? Surely, if we could, we would be able to live happier lives! Miskawayh's classical answer on souls and body humors here seems to miss the point of the question completely. “Why is laughter infectious?” expresses a similar wonderment not addressed in the answer. The question “What is the wisdom of there being mountains?” elicits a scientific answer, but the reader wonders whether it is the kind of answer the questioner was after, or whether instead he was trying to draw out Miskawayh on the theory of possible worlds (as in the famous exchange between Ibn Sina [Avicenna] and al-Biruni). In a similar vein, Tawhidi asks, “Why is it that we grow older but the process isn't reversed?” to which Miskawayh readily gives the textbook answer. But is that what Tawhidi was after?On the other hand, some questions and answers (such as some on injustice, or luck, or worthiness) seem quite genuine and straightforward, but one wonders if Tawhidi is complaining in them about his own hard life and unfortunate circumstances to one of whom he is envious and considers to be less worthy and more fortunate than himself. (Unlike Miskawayh, Tawhidi was never able to land himself a secure position or income.) It is in this latter context, perhaps, that we can better understand the psychological background of the several questions on suicide Tawhidi also includes in his bag of queries. In the end, we are left to wonder whether Tawhidi was simply luring Miskawayh to show himself to be a “novice” and if the latter innocently fell into the trap. Whatever the answer, the book is informative and entertaining.