A note about a Quinean argument against direct reference

Philosophia 24 (1-2):157-170 (1994)
Abstract
In this paper, I argue -- against Steven Wagner -- that Nathan Salmon's semantic theory is not refuted by a suitable variant of Quine's slingshot (Word and Object, 148-9).
Keywords Quine  Salmon  Wagner  slingshot  sustitutivity  direct reference  neo-Fregean  Millian  semantics  pragmatics
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF02379951
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 26,804
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Word and Object.W. V. Quine - 1960 - MIT Press.
Reflexivity.Nathan Salmon - 1986 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27 (3):401-429.
California Semantics Meets the Great Fact.Steven J. Wagner - 1986 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27 (3):430-455.
Semantics for Propositional Attitude Ascriptions.Graham Oppy - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 67 (1):1 - 18.
Why Semantic Innocence?Graham Oppy - 1992 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (4):445 – 454.

View all 6 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Paley's Argument for Design.Graham Oppy - 2002 - Philo 5 (2):161-173.
The Pessimistic Induction, the Flight to Reference and the Metaphysical Zoo.Michael A. Bishop - 2003 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (2):161 – 178.
Direct Reference in Thought and Speech.Kirk A. Ludwig - 1993 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 26 (1):49-76.
Supervenience and Object-Dependent Properties.Thomas Hofweber - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):5-32.
That F.Nathan Salmon - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (2):263 - 280.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

19 ( #256,155 of 2,158,921 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #353,777 of 2,158,921 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums