A note about a Quinean argument against direct reference

Philosophia 24 (1-2):157-170 (1994)
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Abstract

In this paper, I argue -- against Steven Wagner -- that Nathan Salmon's semantic theory is not refuted by a suitable variant of Quine's slingshot (Word and Object, 148-9).

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10.1007/bf02379951

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Graham Oppy
Monash University

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References found in this work

Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Illogical Belief.Nathan Salmon - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:243-285.
Reflexivity.Nathan Salmon - 1986 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27 (3):401-429.
California semantics meets the great fact.Steven J. Wagner - 1986 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27 (3):430-455.
Semantics for propositional attitude ascriptions.Graham Oppy - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 67 (1):1 - 18.

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