Explanatory Limits in the Cognitive Science of Religion: Theoretical Matrix and Evidence Levels

In Hans van Eyghen, Rik Peels & Gijsbert van den Brink (eds.), New Developments in the Cognitive Science of Religion - The Rationality of Religious Belief. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 15-34 (2018)
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Abstract

Cognitive Science of Religion has developed for almost 20 years naturalisticNaturalism explanations on religious mind and behavior, opening that field to scientific scrutiny. Scholars used to study religion from a more humanistic tradition or a hermeneutic approach could feel surprised by the application of biological-evolutionary, cognitive and neurological means to better explain religion. Not too confident with the new approach, many traditional students of religion, like theologians, religion philosophers, phenomenologists, and even psychologists, were often dazzled by the exhibition of new terms, concepts and ways to understand religion, beyond the traditional frames. Time is ripe for an assessment on the plausibility that these new theories exhibit, taking into account their respective frameworks and the reported empirical evidence.

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