Belief and the Development of Hume's Account of Probable Reasoning

In Hume's reason. New York: Oxford University Press (1999)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

After rejecting traditional accounts in terms of reason, Hume presents his own explanation of how we are led from a present impression directly to an idea of something unobserved by the association of ideas set up by past experience. It is this that explains our most basic probable inferences. Hume also has to explain why and how the results of such inferences are believed. What distinguishes belief from mere conception is the very same thing as that which distinguishes impressions from ideas, and ideas of memory from ideas of the imagination: force and vivacity. Once he has an account of these basic inferences and beliefs, he is able to explain how we manage to engage in more complex, reflective reasonings. Such reasonings make use of the uniformity principle and the causal maxim, and Hume is even able to explain how we get the idea of necessary connection. At the end of the story, we have an account of how we manage to perform really difficult and complex feats of reasoning. But this account requires his explanation of the simplest cases of probable reasoning as merely associative, and his account of belief as belonging more to the sensitive than the cogitative part of our natures.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,612

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Probable Reasoning: The Negative Argument.David Owen - 1999 - In Hume's reason. New York: Oxford University Press.
Probability in Hume's Science of Man.Patrick Maher - 1981 - Hume Studies 7 (2):137-153.
Reason, Belief, and Scepticism.David Owen - 1999 - In Hume's reason. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hume's Impressions of Belief.Stacy J. Hansen - 1988 - Hume Studies 14 (2):277-304.
The Limits and Warrant of Reason.David Owen - 1999 - In Hume's reason. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hume's Account of Causation.Sun Demirli - 1999 - Dissertation, Syracuse University
Remembering the Past.Daniel E. Flage - 1989 - Hume Studies 15 (1):236-246.
Remembering the Past.Daniel E. Flage - 1989 - Hume Studies 15 (1):236-246.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-10-25

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

David S. Owen
University of Louisville

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references