De se communication: centered or uncentered?

In Manuel García-Carpintero & Stephan Torre (eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It was pointed out, first by Robert Stalnaker, then also by Andy Egan, that David Lewis’s model of centered-worlds contents has undesired consequences for communication of de se contents. The recent years have seen a number of attempts to save the model by amending it to handle de se communication. Proposals include the appeal to sequences of individuals in the centers, to ersatz classical propositions, and to operations of “re-centering”. The authors are Dilip Ninan and Stephan Torre, Sarah Moss and Max Kölbel, and Alan Gibbard and Clas Weber. The present paper discusses these attempts. The conclusion is that they fail.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,774

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Varieties of Centering and De Se Communication.Dirk Kindermann - 2016 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Stephan Torre (eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 307–40.
The Conversational Role of Centered Contents.Max Kölbel - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (2-3):97-121.
De Se Thought and Communication: An Introduction.Stephan Torre - 2016 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Stephan Torre (eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-21.
Coordinating perspectives: De se and taste attitudes in communication.Dirk Kindermann - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (8):912-955.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-01-13

Downloads
31 (#129,909)

6 months
6 (#1,472,471)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Peter Pagin
Stockholm University

Citations of this work

Assertion.Peter Pagin & Neri Marsili - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Self-ascription and the de se.James Openshaw - 2020 - Synthese 197 (5):2039-2050.
De se names.Maite Ezcurdia & Carla Merino-Rajme - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (3):726-750.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Attitudes de dicto and de se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
Assertion.Robert Stalnaker - 2013 - In Maite Ezcurdia & Robert J. Stainton (eds.), The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary in Philosophy. Peterborough, CA: Broadview Press. pp. 179.

View all 22 references / Add more references