Presentist time travel and the limits of presentist causality

Philosophy 79 (3):333-345 (2001)
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Abstract

A recent account of presentist time travel involves a causal relation between events at two different and discontiguous times, and presentists cannot have such causal relations because presentism rules out the existence of at least one of the two relata in such a relation due to it being non-present. Additionally, presentists cannot have parodies of such causal relations for use in time travel stories because parodies are subject, at least, to the same limitations as the things being parodied. So, the presentist has not successfully given an internally consistent account of presentist time travel.

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David Pensgard
Catholic University of America

Citations of this work

A Defense of Presentist Time Travel.Xuanpu Zhuang - 2022 - Filozofia Nauki 30 (4):101-117.

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References found in this work

Presentists should believe in time-travel.S. Keller & M. Nelson - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):333 – 345.

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