Abstract

In the context of the Convention on Descartes, Leibniz and Modernity, our aim is to show how Foucault followed a course which, although devoid of teleological intention, led him from the criticism of the subject to the subject of criticism. Starting from the criticism of Descartes and of the thinking subject as the basis of knowledge, we aim to show how Foucault first explores the death of the subject as the death of the substantial subject and how he is then urged to move from subjection to subjectivation, thus showing the danger of the separation proposed by Descartes between the subject of knowledge and the ethical subject. This means the constitution of a subject that is ethical instead of moral, the exploration by Foucault of a subject that constructs it self through the practice of liberty, which is made possible through the technologies of self-care. Melete thanatou, or meditatio non death, stands our among these technologies, as an exercise of detachment and practice of the self and the liberty.