Rationality, Reasoning and Group Agency

Dialectica 61 (4):495-519 (2007)
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Abstract

The rationality of individual agents is secured for the most part by their make-up or design. Some agents, however – in particular, human beings – rely on the intentional exercise of thinking or reasoning in order to promote their rationality further; this is the activity that is classically exemplified in Rodin’s sculpture of Le Penseur. Do group agents have to rely on reasoning in order to maintain a rational profile? Recent results in the theory of judgment aggregation show that under a range of plausible conditions they do. In a slogan: group agents are made, not born.

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Philip Pettit
Australian National University

Citations of this work

What is inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.
Eliminating Group Agency.Lars J. K. Moen - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (1):43-66.
Collectivizing Public Reason.Lars J. K. Moen - 2024 - Social Theory and Practice 50 (2):285–306.
Collective Intentionality.David P. Schweikard & Hans Bernhard Schmid - 2012 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Delimiting the Boundaries of Inference.Paul Boghossian - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):55-69.

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References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation.Donald Davidson - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

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