Modal monsters and talk about fiction

Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (3):277-297 (2008)
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Abstract

This paper argues in favor of a treatment of discourse about fiction in terms of operators on character, that is, Kaplanesque ‘monsters’. The first three sections criticize the traditional analysis of ‘according to the fiction’ as an intensional operator, and the approach to fictional discourse grounded on the notion of contextual shifts. The final sections explain how an analysis in terms of monsters yields the correct readings for a variety of examples involving modal and temporal indexicals.

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Stefano Predelli
Nottingham University

Citations of this work

Imagining stories: attitudes and operators.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):639-664.
Fictional names and individual concepts.Andreas Stokke - 2020 - Synthese 198 (8):7829-7859.
Fictional Names and Co-Identification.Andreas Stokke - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23:1-23.
Fiction.Fred Kroon - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Thought and reference.Kent Bach - 1987 - New York: Clarendon Press.
Truth in fiction.David K. Lewis - 1978 - American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1):37–46.
Index, context, and content.David K. Lewis - 1980 - In Stig Kanger & Sven Öhman (eds.), Philosophy and Grammar. Reidel. pp. 79-100.

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