Maximin play in completely mixed strategic games

Theory and Decision 75 (4):543-561 (2013)
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Abstract

Since the seminal paper of Nash (Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 36:48–49, 1950) game theoretic literature has focused mostly on equilibrium and not on maximin (minimax) strategies. In a recent paper of Pruzhansky (Int J Game Theory 40:351–365, 2011) it was shown that under fairy general conditions maximin strategies in completely mixed games can guarantee the same expected payoff as completely mixed Nash equilibrium strategies. Based on this finding, the current paper argues that maximin strategies have important properties. For instance, maximin strategies may refine Nash equilibria in subjective mixed strategies. Further, Bayesian rationality of the players may favor maximin strategies more often than Nash equilibrium strategies. The paper concludes with several suggestions for further experimental research that may shed more light on whether maximin behavior can explain reality better than Nash equilibrium

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