Belief in free will: Integration into social cognition models to promote health behavior

Philosophical Psychology (forthcoming)
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Abstract

The question of whether free will exists has been debated extensively for centuries. Instead of debating this complex issue, recent work in psychology has sought to understand the consequences of beliefs in free will. That is, how are people’s behaviors influenced when they either believe or do not believe in free will? Amongst many outcomes, research has identified free will beliefs to influence achievement, perseverance, and aggressiveness. We believe that beliefs in free will could also exert influence on health behaviors. Health promotion from a psychological perspective has typically adopted social cognitive models to understand and predict health behaviors. We contend that free will beliefs could be included in these models to understand and change health behavior. We provide examples of how a popular social cognition theory, the theory of planned behavior, could be aligned with beliefs in free will. We suggest that the relationship between free will beliefs and theory constructs (attitude, subjective norm, perceived behavioral control, intention) could be positive in health enhancing behaviors and negative in health risk behaviors. Experimentally testing these relationships is needed in future research. This may provide further insights into the consequences of free will and contribute to the explanation of health behavior.

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