Neuroscience and the explanation of psychological phenomena

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):847-849 (1999)

Abstract
Explanatory problems in the philosophy of neuroscience are not well captured by the division between the radical and the trivial neuron doctrines. The actual problem is, instead, whether mechanistic biological explanations across different levels of description can be extended to account for psychological phenomena. According to cognitive neuroscience, some neural levels of description at least are essential for the explanation of psychological phenomena, whereas, in traditional cognitive science, psychological explanations are completely independent of the neural levels of description. The challenge for cognitive neuroscience is to discover the levels of description appropriate for the neural explanation of psychological phenomena.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S0140525X99432194
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 38,992
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
48 ( #150,123 of 2,319,691 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #605,822 of 2,319,691 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature