Discerning subordination and inviolability: A comment on Kamm's intricate ethics

Utilitas 20 (1):81-91 (2008)
Frances Kamm has for some time now been a foremost champion of non-consequentialist ethics. One of her most powerful non-consequentialist themes has been the idea of inviolability. Morality's prohibitions, she argues, confer on persons the status of inviolability. This thought helps articulate a rationale for moral prohibitions that will resist the protean threat posed by the consequentialist argument that anyone should surely be willing to violate a constraint if doing so will minimize the overall number of such violations. As Kamm put it in a 1992 article, ‘If morality permitted minimizing violations of persons by violating other persons, then each of those saved as well as those persons used to save others would be less inviolable. It is the permission, not any actual violation of persons, that makes this so.’ Now, as thus baldly asserted, this claim borders on the conclusory. It is almost as if the claim were that morality conferred on persons the following status: that of being protected from consequentialism. One wants to hear in what inviolability consists, in more detail, so that we can understand it independently of the negation of consequentialism. And there is also an opposite problem: if inviolability is a good, then why can't consequentialism take it into account? Hence, one also wants to hear why this would not be the case
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S0953820807002920
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 31,856
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Intention.Roderick M. Chisholm & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (1):110.
Structures of Normative Theories.James Dreier - 1993 - The Monist 76 (1):22-40.
Morality and Action.Michael Thompson & Warren Quinn - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (2):270.
Intention and Permissibility, I.T. M. Scanlon - 2000 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):301–317.

View all 9 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
The Loop Case and Kamm’s Doctrine of Triple Effect.S. Matthew Liao - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (2):223-231.
Recent Work on the Ethics of Self-Defense.Tyler Doggett - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):220-233.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index

Total downloads
65 ( #91,671 of 2,231,724 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #265,118 of 2,231,724 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature