Abstract

LEWIS’s philosophy is most frequently linked with linguistic conventionalism and is interpreted as reductivistic in its theory of meaning and anti-metaphysical both in spirit and in specific content. Indeed, Lewis is often considered to represent a turning point in American philosophy, marking the beginning of its move away from classical American pragmatism and toward the analytic tradition—either the Vienna Circle type of positivism and constructionalism or the British ordinary language analysis of the post Wittgenstenian variety. True, Lewis is a pragmatist of sorts—a pragmatic analyst. Such a standard script leads inevitably to the fashionable conclusion that there is "something very wrong" with his thought—his construction of objects out of sense-data does not work; his doctrine of the given is self-contradictory, etc. Thus, Lewis’s position becomes significant as an historical lesson in how not to construct one’s analytic philosophy. And, indeed, the fashionable conclusion is, in a certain sense, quite right. His "analytic philosophy" is open to all sorts of reasonable objections by reasonable critics. However, Lewis’s position yields such inadequate analytic philosophy precisely because his pragmatic position does not have its philosophic kinship with the analytic tradition but rather is permeated both in spirit and in content by the tradition of classical American pragmatism.