Genetic Engineering, Human Moral Status, and Moral Subservience

Dissertation, Boston University (1989)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Certain uses of genetic engineering may present problems for, or threats to "humanity." Specific problems treated are ones for "humanity" as a form of moral status. These involve the moral significance of the distinction between humans and nonhumans, and the justifications for moral equality among human beings. To the extent that these depend upon the genetic endowment of humans , genetic changes can change moral status relationships. They can change what counts as a human being, as well as change what treatment human beings are entitled to from other human beings. ;These problems are treated in the context of a discussion of the general function of moral status assignment. A framework for the discussion of moral status is introduced, based on the notion of moral subservience, and in which different levels of subservience form the boundaries of relationships between entities, whether of different or the same moral status. ;Problems raised by genetic engineering for the human/nonhuman distinction are found to be morally significant given a "pro-human speciesist" presupposition. Given certain views of the ontological level at which moral status is manifested, pro-human speciesism cannot be maintained in the face of genetic engineering possibilities. A strengthened basis for pro-human speciesism that grounds moral status in lineages is presented which solves some of these problems. ;Problems raised by genetic engineering for intrahuman moral equality will depend on certain justifications for making some humans subservient to others. In considering the possibility of the "genetic stratification" of human society and the "appropriation of purposes" of genetically-specialized individuals, I attempt to identify social and normative presuppositions that would make such justifications sound. ;The prospects of genetic engineering threaten the equation, at the genetic level, of the "natural" with the "essential," and the relevance of the two for the justification of moral status. The intrusion of human choice into these areas requires greater responsibility for such choices and less reliance upon what is "given." ftn*All degree requirements completed in 1988, but degree will be granted in 1989

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,991

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-02-06

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Robert Rosenfeld
University of Massachusetts, Boston

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references