Philosophical Studies 159 (1):139-146 (2012)
AbstractI advance an objection to Graham Priest’s account of fictional entities as nonexistent objects. According to Priest, fictional characters do not have, in our world, the properties they are represented as having; for example, the property of being a bank clerk is possessed by Joseph K. not in our world but in other worlds. Priest claims that, in this way, his theory can include an unrestricted principle of characterization for objects. Now, some representational properties attributed to fictional characters, a kind of fictional entities, involve a crucial reference to the world in which they are supposed to be instantiated. I argue that these representational properties are problematic for Priest’s theory and that he cannot accept an unrestricted version of the principle of characterization. Thus, while not refuting Priest’s theory, I show that it is no better off than other Meinongian theories.
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Citations of this work
Existence as a Real Property: The Ontology of Meinongianism.Francesco Berto - 2012 - Dordrecht: Synthèse Library, Springer.
On the Methodological Restriction of the Principle of Characterization.Maciej Sendłak - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):807-825.
On the Methodological Restriction of the Principle of Characterization.Maciej Sendłak - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):807-825.
References found in this work
Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts.Kendall L. Walton - 1990 - Harvard University Press.
Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality.Graham Priest - 2005 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.