Abstract

Jerry Fodor has recently argued for a version of nativism based on the claim that it is impossible to give a cognitive account of how new cognitive powers are acquired. Piaget has insisted that without such an account, it is impossible to understand what cognition is. My main concern in this work has been to expose and clarify the deeper philosophical disagreements that underlie the surface dispute. ;This work brings to light basic disagreements over the nature of knowledge, over what the fundamental units of cognitive psychology are, and over what cognitive psychology ought to explain. For each side of the dispute, I devote two chapters to articulating a set of basic assumptions, defending their prima facie plausibility, and showing how they lead to either Fodor's or Piaget's claim. Fodor's nativism is presented as a true claim about the logical character of certain sorts of representational theories of cognition. Piaget's theory is interpreted as an account of increasing knowledge of objects rather than as an account of internal mental organization. So interpreted, Piaget's theory avoids Fodor's charge of incoherence, avoids some common objections to the notions of stage and equilibration, and presents a radically new understanding of knowledge and cognition. ;To explicate Fodor's claim, I show how it arises from one line of thought within standard views about the nature of epistemology and cognitive psychology. In the process, I identify assumptions that are crucial for understanding the conflict between Fodor and Piaget. The contrasting assumptions I develop to make sense of Piaget's claim are that: knowledge of objects is direct ; the fundamental units of cognitive psychology are interactions and interaction patterns ; and, cognitive explanations show how present interaction patterns and the nature of the known object generate new cognitive powers.