Rational Thinking and Intellectually Virtuous Thinking: Identical, Extensionally Equivalent, or Substantively Different?

Informal Logic 43 (2):204-223 (2023)
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Abstract

(1) Is the rational person _eo ipso_ intellectually virtuous? (2) Is the intellectually virtuous person _eo ipso_ rational? In what follows I answer both questions in the negative.

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10.22329/il.v43i2.8007

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