Associative political obligations

Ethics 106 (2):247-273 (1996)
Abstract
It is claimed by philosophers as diverse as Burke, Walzer, Dworkin, and MacIntyre that our political obligations are best understood as "associative" or "communal" obligations--that is, as obligations that require neither voluntary undertaking nor justification by "external" moral principles, but rather as "local" moral responsibilities whose normative weight derives entirely from their assignment by social practice. This paper identifies three primary lines of argument that appear to support such assertions: conceptual arguments, the arguments of nonvoluntarist contract theory, and communitarian arguments (which emphasize both an "identity thesis" and a "normative independence thesis"). However, each of these lines of argument fails to show that political obligations are associative obligations.
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DOI 10.1086/233617
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Liberalism, Samaritanism, and Political Legitimacy.Christopher H. Wellman - 1996 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 25 (3):211-237.

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