Rescher on nomic necessity

Philosophical Studies 28 (3):227 - 228 (1975)
(2) All X’s have to be Y’s is to be brought out by glossing the latter as a stronger, nomological generalization involving counterfactural claims, thus: (3) All X’s are Y’s and further if any z that is not an X were an X, then z would be a Y. Professor Rescher points out that while (1) is equivalent to its contrapositive..
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DOI 10.1007/BF00375994
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