Metaphilosophy 43 (5):551-566 (2012)

Authors
Nathan Sinclair
University of Sydney (PhD)
Abstract
One of the major historical effects of Quine’s attacks upon the analytic-synthetic distinction has been to popularise the belief that philosophy is continuous with science. Currently, most philosophers believe that such continuity is an inevitable consequence of naturalism. This article argues that though Quine’s semantic holism does imply that there is no sharp distinction between truths discoverable by scientific investigation and truths discoverable by philosophical investigation, it also implies that there is a perfectly sharp and natural distinction between natural science and naturalistic philosophy.
Keywords analytic  continuity  distinction  holism  limits  method  naturalism  Quine  continuous  science
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2012.01768.x
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References found in this work BETA

Experimental Philosophy.Joshua Knobe - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (1):81–92.
Analyticity Reconsidered.Paul Artin Boghossian - 1996 - Noûs 30 (3):360-391.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Possibility of Naturalized Metaphysics.Rasmus Jaksland - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Copenhagen

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