Erkenntnis 84 (6):1369-1386 (2019)
Authors | |
Abstract |
Titelbaum Oxford studies in epistemology, 2015) has recently argued that the Enkratic Principle is incompatible with the view that rational belief is sensitive to higher-order defeat. That is to say, if it cannot be rational to have akratic beliefs of the form “p, but I shouldn’t believe that p,” then rational beliefs cannot be defeated by higher-order evidence, which indicates that they are irrational. In this paper, I distinguish two ways of understanding Titelbaum’s argument, and argue that neither version is sound. The first version can be shown to rest on a subtle, but crucial, misconstrual of the Enkratic Principle. The second version can be resisted through careful consideration of cases of higher-order defeat. The upshot is that proponents of the Enkratic Principle are free to maintain that rational belief is sensitive to higher-order defeat.
|
Keywords | Higher-Order Defeat Higher-Order Evidence Epistemic Enkrasia The Enkratic Principle Epistemic Rationality |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
ISBN(s) | |
DOI | 10.1007/s10670-018-0012-x |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
View all 45 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Higher-Order Defeat and the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence.Mattias Skipper - forthcoming - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
The Challenge of Heritability: Genetic Determinants of Beliefs and Their Implications.Wade Munroe - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (8):831-874.
Higher-Order Defeat Without Epistemic Dilemmas.Mattias Skipper - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (4):451-465.
Similar books and articles
Higher-Order Defeat is Object-Independent.Joshua DiPaolo - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.
Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.
Respecting All the Evidence.Paulina Sliwa & Sophie Horowitz - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2835-2858.
Epistemic Akrasia, Higher-Order Evidence, and Charitable Belief Attribution.Hamid Vahid - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4):296-314.
Epistemic Akrasia, Higher-Order Evidence, and Charitable Belief Attribution.Hamid Vahid - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4):296-314.
On the Epistemic Significance of Evidence You Should Have Had.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):449-470.
Is the Enkratic Principle a Requirement of Rationality?Andrew Reisner - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (4):436-462.
Norman and Truetemp Revisited Reliabilistically: A Proper Functionalist Defeat Account of Clairvoyance.Harmen8 Ghijsen - 2015 - Episteme 13 (1):89-110.
Bridging Rationality and Accuracy.Miriam Schoenfield - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (12):633-657.
Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):294-312.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2018-04-30
Total views
320 ( #24,339 of 2,404,066 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
54 ( #14,273 of 2,404,066 )
2018-04-30
Total views
320 ( #24,339 of 2,404,066 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
54 ( #14,273 of 2,404,066 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads